unencumbered subject of possession in the case of Rawls

"For justice to be the first virtue, certain things must be true of us. We must be creatures of a certain kind, related to human circumstance in a certain way. We must stand at a certain distance from our circumstance, whether as transcendental subject in the case of Kant, or as essentially unencumbered subject of possession in the case of Rawls. Either way, we must regard ourselves as independent: independent from the interests and attachments we may have at any moment, never identified by our aims but always capable of standing back to survey and assess and possibly to revise them (Rawls 1979: 7; 1980: 544–5)".
Conclusion: Liberalism and the Limits of Justice pp. 175-183

• Rawls, A well-orderd society. In Philosophy, politics, and society, fifth series / a collection edited by Peter Laslett and James Fishkin

Oxford : B. Blackwell , 1979

• John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, The Journal of Philosophy 77:515-572, 1980